“Whose Nature: Bioprospecting in Third World Countries”

P.J. Lomelino

University of Colorado, Boulder

In this paper, I would like to take Proctor’s argument one step further and explore to what extent his methodological guidelines provide sufficient conditions for arriving at a set of method components from which one can eventually formulate an inclusive environmental policy (one that incorporates and applies to differing views of the environment).  After laying out Proctor’s argument, I will apply his proposed methodological guidelines to the issue of bioprospecting in Third World countries.  In doing so, I will argue that (where there is a larger objective component to the issue) these guidelines seem to provide a sufficient framework from which to devise a set of methods.  However, I will argue that this is an artificial sufficiency since, once we extend our scope to incorporate drastically different views of how to treat the environment, it becomes apparent that these guidelines are not sufficient for arriving at an inclusive environmental policy.

Because I am here concerned with the success of Proctor’s proposed methodological components for bridging the gap between differing environmental ethics, I will not go into detail regarding his discussion of the differing views of nature (the Ancient Forest, in particular) that lead to contrasting ethics.  Instead, I shall focus on his proposed methodological components, expanding them where needed.

Proctor’s Guidelines

 

                  In attempting to bridge the gap between differing environmental ethics with regards to the Ancient Forests, Proctor proposes what he refers to as “some major landmarks to keep in sight (295)”.  According to Proctor, we should: (1) strive for a realist notion of moral pluralism; (2) take an anthropogenic approach; and (3) take into account important relationships with regard to location.  In mentioning that these landmarks have to do with process (and not product; 295), it appears that he is presenting us with methodological suggestions.  However, it also appears that these are more than mere suggestions, for at the end of his article Proctor refers to the “necessity of moral pluralism; the inevitability of an anthropogenic… approach; and the need to root, but not limit, ethics to place (Italics added; 295).” Thus, in response to the problem of the current contrasting environmental ethics that stem from differing views of nature, Proctor presents us with three necessary methodological suggestions.

 

Striving for Moral Pluralism

 

In presenting his first guideline of striving for a realist moral pluralism, Proctor argues that we should be neither Absolutist nor Relativist.  Instead, we should strive to be somewhere in the middle.  In order to accomplish this middle ground, he asserts that we must “embrace a necessary paradox (290)”.  On the one hand, we must address the strongly subjective aspect present in the Ancient Forest campaign that is comprised of diverse perspectives with regards to how we should treat the environment.  For example, we must take into account the varying interpretations of nature and the differing environmental ethics that stem from these.  At the same time, however, we must also recognize the objective aspects of the Ancient Forest debate.  For example, despite their differing perspectives of nature, Proctor points out that both sides of the Ancient Forest campaign value the forest and its inhabitants and are concerned with the effects of their actions on these.

Although Proctor informs us that we must strive for a realist notion of moral pluralism, he does not expand on how this can be implemented into a method component that can help us to arrive at an inclusive environmental policy (and, with all due respect, this is not his intent).  Yet, we can certainly take his suggestion a step further and attempt to formulate such a component.  Keeping in mind Proctor’s suggestion to embrace the subjective/ objective paradox, it makes sense that we should first locate the subjective and objective elements within a debate.   Doing places us in a position in which we can now take into account the differing subjective perspectives while grounding the discussion in an objective component.  The advantage of doing this, I believe, is that it respects and recognizes the importance that differing views of the environment have without getting lost in this diversity (since we are able to utilize the objective element as a starting point for productive discussions of how we should treat the environment).

Taking an Anthropogenic Approach

The second methodological guideline that Proctor presents is to strike a balance regarding our emphasis on human beings.  On one end of the spectrum is the nonanthropocentric environmental ethic – an ethic that asserts that nature’s value does not rely on being instrumentally valuable to human beings.  Yet, as Proctor points out, we should reject relying on this extreme ethic for two reasons.  First, it is limited and rules out those who hold an anthropocentric view of nature.  On the other hand, he also argues that we should reject relying on a purely anthropocentric ethic (according to which nature’s value rests solely on its instrumental benefit to humankind) for two reasons.  Not only does it rule out those who hold a nonanthropocentric view, but it also fails to provide any justification for valuing the environment aside from human needs.  Instead of adopting either a nonanthropocentric or an anthropocentric approach, then, Proctor argues that we should take an anthropogenic approach – one that acknowledges (but is not driven primarily by) human concerns.

Although he does not mention this, it is important to note that the additional benefit of taking an anthropogenic approach: doing so helps to reinforce our striving for a realist notion of moral pluralism.  Recall that while some value the environment from an instrumental standpoint, others value it from a noninstrumental standpoint.  By taking into account both the instrumental and noninstrumental value of the environment, an anthropogenic approach supports the first methodological approach of striving for moral pluralism by incorporating the various subjective perspectives with regard to the environment.

Considering Location and Relevant Relationships

 

Lastly, Proctor argues that we must take location into consideration when attempting to formulate an inclusive environmental policy.  According to Proctor, we must recognize that people’s ethics arise from their experiences with nature.  Hence, in the example of the Pacific Northwest Forests, all the experiences of those who have interacted with the forests should be considered.  In addition, the experience of the forest itself (its fire history, climate and vegetation changes) must also be taken into account when considering how we should treat this area.  In taking location into account, however, it is important to note that Proctor warns that we should not be limited to location alone.  In addition to the relationship between the land and the people, we must also consider other relationships that extend beyond the borders of the Ancient Forest.

As with his previous guideline of taking an anthropogenic approach, Proctor again does not mention what appears to be an additional benefit of incorporating location.  With the suggestion to consider location and its relation to broader relevant aspects of society, incorporating location helps to broaden the scope of an environmental policy, making it that much more thorough and inclusive.

In expanding on the methodological guidelines that Proctor presents, I have argued that we can derive method components that will be helpful in eventually arriving at an inclusive environmental policy.  First, based on Proctor’s insistence that we adopt a realist moral pluralism, I argued that we must make room for varying perspectives with regard to the environment while grounding the discussion in an objective element.  Next, I have argued that his second methodological guideline – taking an anthropogenic approach – expands the scope of inclusiveness by insisting that we consider both the instrumental and noninstrumental ways in which we value the environment.  And finally, I argued that Proctor reinforces and broadens the scope of inclusion even further by requiring us to take into account location and its relevant relationships.

 

Applying These Method Components to Bioprospecting

 

Having layed out Proctor’s methodological suggestions, let me now apply them to a difficult environmental issue in order to test their sufficiency.  The environmental issue I have in mind is bioprospecting, a recently-debated issue in both environmental studies and philosophy. Bioprospecting is generally defined as “scientific research that looks for a useful application, process, or product in nature.”[1]  Once scientists confirm that an environmental resource can have useful applications, the remaining bioprospecting process can take on one of two forms. First, bioprospecting can consist of bioharvesting – the direct harvesting of environmental resources that corporations (who employ the scientists) have “found” to be beneficial.  Fortunately, the Convention on Biodiversity  (CBD) makes it illegal for anyone to deplete natural resources to the extent that doing so negatively impacts biodiversity.[2]  Consequently, the second form of bioprospecting has received the most attention -- bioprospecting that occurs when corporations take a sample environmental resource, test it for beneficial applications, and attempt to reproduce this benefit in a laboratory with the goal of eventually arriving at a marketable product.

Differing Views of Nature

 

                  Although both corporations and Third World communities consider nature to be a resource, they differ in how they believe this resource should be owned.  On the one hand, corporations consider environmental resources to be privately owned.  Based on this belief, patent laws and intellectual property rights (IPRs)[3]were developed within Western cultures as a means of establishing and protecting one’s claim to environmental resources.  On the other hand, many Third World communities consider the environment to be a communally owned resource.  Consequently, they have had no reason to implement a system of IPRs, nor have they foreseen the need to establish patent laws to protect such ownership.

                  With many Third World communities’ notion of nature as a communally owned resource juxtaposed to corporations’ notion of nature as a privately owned resource, the problem of bioprospecting presents as good a test as any for the sufficiency of Proctor’s guidelines.  Recall that Proctor suggests that we keep the following three things in mind when attempting to formulate an environmental policy that addresses conflicting views of nature: (1) We should strive for a realist notion of moral pluralism; (2) We should take into account (but not be limited to) location; and (3) We should take an anthropogenic approach.

Striving for Moral Pluralism

 

In order to incorporate the first guideline (a realist notion of moral pluralism), recall that we must takes into account both the subjective elements (the diverse perspectives) and the objective element of any given environmental issue.  Based on the method component that I derived from Proctor’s guideline, we should begin by trying to identify the shared objective aspect of the debate.  Although they interpret nature as a communal resource, some Third World persons share the similar objective with corporations in that they also desire to profit from their environmental resources.[4],[5]

Keeping this in mind, then, it seems possible to achieve a realist notion of moral pluralism regarding bioprospecting in these cases.  Such a notion would take into account the objective fact that both Western corporations and some Third World communities desire to profit from bioprospecting.  At the same time, this moral pluralism must also consider the differing aspects with regard to ownership of environmental resources.  Thus, corporations should recognize that indigenous persons currently have a claim to their resources, a recognition that would then allow Third World communities to have a stake in the profits resulting from bioprospecting.  At the same time, these communities should recognize the stake in the profits that corporations are entitled to based on their immense investment of time, money and technology in arriving at a marketable product.  In applying this method component to bioprospecting, then, we should consider such questions as: Did the indigenous use of a certain plant for medicinal purposes completely outside of those eventually gleaned through bioprospecting cause corporations to look at this plant as a possible medicinal source in the first place?  If so, then the indigenous population’s share of the benefits should be proportionately small.  If, on the other hand, corporations were able to produce a product that replicated the plant and its exact medicinal purposes for which an indigenous population uses it, then the indigenous population should receive a much larger share of the profits.

Considering Location and Relevant Relationships

 

Because many Third World indigenous persons interpret their environmental resources in a different manner than corporations (as communal property rather than as individual property), taking this difference into account also takes into account persons’ relationship with the land.  In other words, it aligns with the second guideline that Proctor presents – taking into account location.  However, it is important to note that, in doing so, a proposed environmental policy is not limited to considering just location (thus, fulfilling a further aspect of Proctor’s guideline to not limit ourselves to location alone).

With this in mind, there appear to be two important relevant relationships in bioprospecting.  First, it is important to note that disagreements over ownership and benefit sharing occur within the larger realm of a market economy.  In recognizing this relationship, an inclusive environmental policy should acknowledge both the corporation’s input and the extent to which Third World communities’ resources and traditional knowledge have added to the development of a marketable product.  Second, an inclusive policy should also recognize particulars about the relationship between corporations and communities within the market economy.  In addressing this relationship, one quickly notes the disparate power between these parties.  A thorough application of Proctor’s second guideline requires us to strive to create an atmosphere in which all parties have equal negotiating power regarding sharing benefits. (Of course, this is not to imply that benefits should be shared equally.  Instead, equal consideration should be given to the role of each party’s input in achieving an eventual marketable product.)[6]

Taking an Anthropogenic Approach

 

In addition to considering location and incorporating moral pluralism, an environmental bioprospecting policy should also take into account the anticipated benefits to humanity that bioprospecting environmental resources in Third World countries may have.  With 60-70% of the world’s biodiversity residing in seventeen Third World countries[7], the environmental resources in these countries provide the opportunity for discovering cures to many fatal and severely debilitating diseases and illnesses.  However, in weighing these benefits, recall that Proctor warns that we must not take an anthropocentric approach.  Instead, we must follow his third guideline (taking an anthropogenic approach).  In other words, we must weigh the benefits to humanity along with nonanthropocentric considerations (such as taking care not to negatively impact the environment through excessive bioharvesting).

 

Are These Method Components Sufficient for Arriving at an Inclusive Environmental Policy?

 

Thus far, the method components that I was able to derive from Proctor’s methodological guidelines seem to provide a framework from which one can construct an inclusive environmental policy.  As a result, one might be inclined to conclude that these methods are sufficient for constructing an inclusive environmental policy.  However, one would be rash to draw such a conclusion.  In applying these methods to the problem of bioprospecting, it is important to note that I have represented just one possible interpretation of nature within Third World communities (the view of nature as a communally owned resource that can be commodified). 

But what if, on the other hand, one interprets communally owned resources as being globally owned resources?[8]  Once we consider the interpretation of the environment as a global resource that is owned by a global community, there is no longer the shared objective basis of interpreting nature as something that can be commodified for financial gain.  Based on a globally owned interpretation, environmental resources (regardless of their geographic location) should be available for all who need them.  Consequently, these resources must not be commodified in the marketplace since doing so would immediately restrict some from being able to benefit from them.

                  Obviously, the result of incorporating this third interpretation of nature is that the underlying objective aspect in the bioprospecting debate has shifted.  No longer is it the case that all sides agree that the environment can and should be commodified.  Instead, the shared objective basis has shifted to the fact that all sides agree that humanity can and should benefit from environmental resources.  The result of this shift is that the diametrically opposed viewpoints now introduced regarding commodification seem to make it far more difficult to arrive at an inclusive environmental policy using Proctor’s guidelines than I was able to do when both sides agreed on commodification.  This bears noting since it points to the insufficiency of Proctor’s proposed methodological guidelines.   In other words, we have reason at this point to question whether he has presented us with a sufficient list.  Due to the length of this paper, I will not go into further detail regarding this problem.  However, I mention it in closing to illustrate that, as useful as I have argued that Proctor’s guidelines can be, we must also keep in mind that they are not sufficient.

Conclusion

 

                  In this paper, I have argued that Proctor’s methodological guidelines can help us arrive at a set of useful method components for eventually arriving at an inclusive environmental policy.  To illustrate, I applied his guidelines (of striving for moral pluralism, considering location, and taking an anthropogenic approach) to the problem of bioprospecting in Third World countries in which both sides of the debate agree that the environment is a commidifiable resource.  In doing so, I arrived at a set of method components that seemed sufficient for constructing an inclusive environmental policy.  However, I also argued that this success does not mean that Proctor has presented us with a sufficient list of methodological guidelines.  Once we broaden the scope of the differing interpretations of nature and take into account the notion of the environment as a globally owned resource, it becomes clear that these guidelines are not sufficient for arriving at an inclusive environmental policy.  Despite this difficulty, I would like to leave the reader with the conclusion that  Proctor’s guidelines are still useful within a limited context.  When the shared objective is an interpretation of nature as a commodifiable resource, one can develop these guidelines into a useful set of methods for arriving at an inclusive environmental policy.

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